Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 49 | Issue 6

Article 16

1959

Sufficiency of Warrants under the Fourth
Amendment
H. Frank Jr. Way

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
Recommended Citation
H. Frank Jr. Way, Sufficiency of Warrants under the Fourth Amendment, 49 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 612 (1958-1959)

This Criminology is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
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The liberal protection of personal privacy under
the Fourth Amendment again appears to have the
support'of a majority of the members of the United
States Supreme Court. After a narrow construction
of the Amendment under the Vinson Court,' the
Warren Court has now handed down three search
and seizure cases that are more in conformity to
the liberal construction of the Amendment which
the Court has traditionally asserted since the days
of the classic Boyd case.2 Of the three recent cases,
Giardenello v. United States3 concerns one of the
most basic elements of the Fourth Amendment,
and that is the element of probable cause in arrest,
search, and seizure. The Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, .houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
In the Giordenello case an agent of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation obtained an arrest warrant
for Giordenello. The warrant was based on the
sworn complaint of the agent, which read, in part,
as follows:
The undersigned complainant being duly sworn
states: That on or about January 26, 1956, at
Houston, Texas,... Giordenello did receive, conceal, etc. narcotic drugs, to wit: heroin hydrochloride with knowledge of unlawful importation....
On January 27 the agent arrested the petitioner
as he emerged from a residence. At the time of
I See United States v. Harris, 331 U. S. 145 (1947);
United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950).
2
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1887); the
three recent cases are: Jones v. United States, 78 S.
Ct. 1253, 1958, no degree of probable cause will allow
search of a home without a warrant; Miller v. United
States, 78 S. Ct. 1190 (1958). the use of force in arrest,
search or seizure is valid only when officer meets with
resistance after informing the occupant of his authority
and purpose.
3 78 S. Ct. 1245 (1958).

arrest the agent made an incidental search of
Giordenello which resulted in the seizure of a brown
paper bag containing heroin. The petitioner challenged the sufficiency of the warrant, asserting that
its issuance lacked the requirement of probable
cause. If the petitioner was correct in his assertion,
then under the federal exclusionary rule with respect to illegally seized evidence the heroin should
not have been used as evidence and a reversal of the
conviction was mandatory. 4 The Supreme Court
agreed with the petitioner that the warrant lacked
a sufficient basis upon which a finding of probable
cause could be made and reversed the conviction.
Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the six man
majority of the court, said:
The purpose of the complaint ... is to enable the
appropriate magistrate, here a Commissioner, to
determine whether the 'probable cause' required
to support a warrant exists. The Commissioner
must judge for himself the persuasiveness of the
facts relied on by a complaining officer to show
probable cause. He should not accept without
question the complainant's mere conclusion that
the person whose arrest is sought has committed
a crime. When the complaint in this case is
judged with these considerations in mind, it is
clear that it does not pass muster because it does
not provide any basis for the Commissioner's
determination under Rule 4 that probable cause
existed. The complaint contains no affirmative
allegation that the affiant spoke with personal
knowledge of the matters contained therein; it
does not indicate any sources for the complainant's belief; and it does not set forth any
other sufficient basis upon which a finding of
probable cause could be made. We think these
deficiencies could not be cured by the Commissioner's reliance upon a presumption that the
4See Rules 3-4, FEDERAL RuLEs OF CRIMINAL
18 USCA, for the statement on probable
cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant, also Rule
41 for warrants for search and seizure, 18 USCA 461.
As regards the exclusionary rule generally, see Weeks
v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914).
PRocnua,
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complaint was made on the personal knowledge
of the complaining officer.5
Mr. Justice Clark, with Justices Burton and
Whittaker concurring, dissented from the majority
opinion. Mr. Justice Clark maintained that if the
agent swore to the statement he made before the
commissioner, then the statement constituted
sufficient grounds for probable cause. This assertion by the dissent is indeed strange as it would
amount to allowing magistrates to issue "information and belief warrants", a type of warrant
that American courts have long held to be in violation of the Fourth Amendment's requirement
that no warrant shall issue except upon probable
6
cause supported by oath or affirmation.
REQUIREMENTS OF PROBABLE CAUSE:

GENERAL

MEANING

The Giordenello decision was not precise as to
the meaning of probable cause; however, many
previous decisions of the Court do spell out with
some exactness the meaning of this phrase. One
of the earliest pronouncements of the federal judiciary on this point was in a case which arose out
of the Aaron Burr fiasco. In the treason case of
United States v. Bollman,' the circuit court stated
that probable cause means, "... . a probability that
the crime has been committed by that person. Of
this probability the court or magistrate issuing the
warrant must be satisfied by facts supported by
oath or affirmation. The facts ... must induce a
reasonable probability that all the acts have been
done which constitute the offense charged". 8
The normal procedure for the issuance of the
warrant is for the law enforcement officer to
appear before a judge or commissioner and file a
complaint of violation of the law and request a
warrant, just as was done in the Giordenello case.9
Upon the presentation of sworn affidavits the
judicial officer is to determine whether grounds for
issuance of the warrant exists, that is, whether
there is probable cause to support the warrant. 10
PROBABLE

CAUSE

AND

THIRD

PARTY

AFFIDAvrrs

In carrying out the above judicial function it
would seem desirable that the judge have before
5 78 S. Ct. 1245; 1250 (1958).
6See infra p. 614.

724 Fed. Case 1189, No. 14,622 (1807).
4 Ibid, p. 1192; see also, Ex parte Burford, 3 Cranch
448 (1806).
9 Warrants issue also upon indictments, see Albrecht
v. United States, 273 U.S. 1 (1927).
10See, Rule 41, FEDERAL RuLEs
PROCEDURE, section c, 18 USCA 461.
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him the oath of the original accuser, either by personal examination or in the form of a sworn
affidavit." Personal examination is frequently not
practical, and the courts have gone a long way
towards assisting executive officers in the prosecution of violations of the law by allowing probable
cause to be established on a broader basis, that is,
by the use of third party affidavits. 2 If the courts
allowed the executive officer merely to swear to an
affidavit whose contents were based on the unsworn
information of third parties, then this would
amount to allowing an information and belief
warrant. The facts which must be sworn to are
those within the knowledge of the parties making
them. 13 Thus, except for certain well-defined exceptions 4 the Fourth Amendment requires a sworn
statement of facts within the personal knowledge
of the party making the allegation of probable
cause of a crime.
FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES:

PRUDENT MAN THEORY
The federal courts have accepted what might be
called the "prudent man theory" as a basis for determining the existence of probable cause. Under
this theory the courts have held that if the facts
and circumstances before the judge are such as
to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the alleged offense has been committed,
then there is sufficient cause for the issuance of a
warrant."5 However, in the early development of
the federal lav of search and seizure little distinction was made between the terms ':probable
cause to believe" and "probable cause to suspect";
in fact they were used interchangeably.' 6 Chief
"In re Rule of Court, 20 Fed. Case 1337, No.
12,126 (1877).
2 Schencks v. United States, 2 F. 2d 185 (1924).
"3United States v. Michalski, 265 Fed. 841 (1919).
" The names of confidential sources of executive
information are generally exempt in the requirement
of a sworn affidavit, Segurola v. United States, 275
U.S. 106, 113 (1927); Scher v. United States, 305
U.S. 251 (1938); however if the name of the informant
is essential to the defense's case, then the executive
must be prepared to produce it, United States v.
Keown, 19 F. Supp. 639 (1937) and Cannon v. United
States, 158 F. 2d 952 (1946). United States v. One
1941 Oldsmobile Sedan, 158 F. 2d 818 (1947); contra:
United States v. Li Fat Tong, 152 F. 2d 650 (1945).
See also, "Refusal to Name Informant as Contempt of
Court," 46 HARv.L. REv. 343 (1932); "Privilege to
Conceal Informer's Identity," 32 COL. L. REv. 1245
(1932) and McCormick, Evidence (1954), ch. 14, §148,
f.n. 11.
15Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878).
16 A similar lack of distinction between the two
terms can be seen in the early English law on this
subject. See, 13 and 14 Char. II, ch. 33, sec. 15, Licensing Act of 1662.
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Justice Marshall, sitting as a committing magistrate in the Aaron Burr case defined probable
cause in the following manner: "I understand
probable cause to be a cause made out by proof,
furnishing good reason to believe that the crime
alleged has been committed by the person charged
with having committed it."'17 Yet Mr. Justice
Washington, sitting as a circuit judge in Munns v.
Dupont de Nemours,8 defined probable cause as
"... a reasonable ground for suspicion, supported
by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves
to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the
party is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged."' 9 This definition, which is something of
a hybrid between suspicion and belief, was picked
up by several later cases. 20 In fact, in Stacy v.
Emery2 ' the Supreme Court first stated a definition
of probable cause which centered around the word
belief and then went on to quote the Munns case
on suspicion as in conformity with its own definition. In most of the areas of the law of search and
seizure, the courts have come to use the standard
of "probable cause to believe" and if suspicion is
allowed as a standard it is limited to a "wellgrounded suspicion". 2'
There is probably some justification for assuming that any prolonged discussion of the distinctions which may be implied from the words "suspicion" and "belief" would only result in an
imaginary duel of legal semanticists. Yet it should
be recognized that the law does attempt ". . . to
draw some distinction between a low grade of
knowledge and a high grade of belief; somewhere
mixed up in that content of mental operation is
what is called 'suspicion'." '
Turning now to a more concrete topic, what
facts are sufficient to sustain a finding of probable
cause? First, the facts are those which must be
placed before the courts in a sworn statement, and
if the affidavit is based on a fiction, then the ac24
cuser lays himself open to a charge of perjury.
Secondly, the facts necessary are those which will
conform to the general definition of probable cause
arrived at in the above discussion, that is, facts
17 1 Burr's Trial 11 (1807).
18 17 Fed. Case 993, No. 9,926 (1811).
39Ibd., p. 999.
20Sanders v. Palmer, 55 Fed. 217, 220 (1893);
United States v. The Recorder, 27 Fed. Case 723, No.
16 (1830); Wilmarth v. Mountford, 30 Fed. Case 70,
No. 17,774 (1821).
2197 U.S. 642, 645 (1878).
2'
See Wilmarth v. Mountford, 30 Fed. Case 70,
No. 17,774 (1821).
23 1 ALEXANDER, LAW OF ARREST IN CRIMINAL
AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS (1949) 451.
24 Veeder v. United States, 252 Fed. 414,418, (1918).
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which, when the law ". . . is properly applied to
them, tend to establish probable cause for believing that the legal conclusion is right." 25 This does
not mean that the facts necessary are those which
would be required for a conviction, but it does
mean that the evidence presented to sustain the
issuance of the warrant ". . . would be competent
in the trial of the offense before a jury and would
lead a man of prudence and caution to believe that
26
the offense has been committed."
2'
Dumbra v. United States can be taken as an
example of the application of the "prudent man
theory." Here the plaintiff held a permit under the
National Prohibition Act to manufacture and sell
wines on his premises for non-beverage purposes.
On two occasions an agent of the Prohibition
Bureau had negotiated the purchase of wine from
the members of the Dumbra family in their grocery
store which adjoined the registered winery. On
neither occasion did they inquire of the agent
whether he was authorized under the law to purchase wine for sacramental-religious purposes. The
agent applied for a search warrant and set forth in
his sworn statement the facts of his past negotiations with the members of the Dumbra family.
Mr. justice Stone, in his opinion for the majority,
held that:
the apparent readiness of members of the family
of a person in control of the suspected premises
to sell intoxicating liquors to casual purchasers
without inquiry as to their right to purchase and
the actual production of the liquor sold, in one
instance from the premises suspected and in the
other from the vicinity of those premises,...
give rise to a reasonable belief that the liquors
on the suspected premises were possessed for
the purpose and with the intent of selling them
unlawfully to casual purchasers. 8
These facts were sufficient to find the necessary
probable cause and in fact and "absence of a wellgrounded belief that such was the fact could be
ascribed only to a lack of intelligence or a singular
lack of practical experience on the part of the
officer."1
INFORMATION AND BELIE=

WARRANTS

In the Dumbra case it will be noted that the
agent had to give his oath upon the basis of facts
25Loc. cit.
26 Grau v. United States, 287 U. S. 124, 128, (1932);
see also, Giles v. United States, 284 Fed. 208, (1926).
268 U. S. 435 (1925).
28Ibid., p. 441.
21Loc. cit.
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either within his personal knowledge or from his
experience. The courts have held that mere suspicion or unsupported belief is not sufficient to
call into operation such a drastic measure as the
issuance of a search or arrest warrant. This was
what the Supreme Court was directing its attention
to in the G-iordenello case, as the warrant had been
issued only upon the belief of the agent, unsupported by the facts to support his allegation of the
crime. The so-called "information and belief"
warrant has continually been held to be void under
the Fourth Amendment for it smacks of the infamous general warrants, that is, the writs of assistance, which the framers of the Fourth AmendN0
ment wished to outlaw.
The obvious intention of
the Fourth Amendment is to protect the individual
from unwarrailted invasions of his privacy and an
invasion of this privacy, to be warranted, must be
based on more than the mere suspicion of a police
officer 3
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE .AND TE HEARSAY RU=E

One aspect of the recent Giordenello case which
merits some examination is the relationship between the requirement of personal knowledge to
that of the so-called "hearsay rule." While the
Court specifically stated that it was not deciding
the issue of the sufficiency of warrants based entirely on hearsay information, yet the reasoning of
the Court came close to the hearsay rule.n
One of the allegations of the petitioner was that
the warrant was insufficient because it was based
on hearsay information rather than personal knowledge. But the Court stated that it would not decide the hearsay issue ". . for in any event we find
the complaint defective in not providing a sufficient basis upon which a finding of probable cause
could be made."" The Court noted that while
the warrant did not give the sources of the affiant's
information, yet it was apparent from his subsequent testimony that he had received his informa-1 See LAssoN, HISTORY AND DEVELOPmENT or

FouRTH AsNsmNmrr (1937) ch. 2.
3
Nthanso v. United States, 290 U. S. 41, 47,
1933; Go-Bart Importing Company, 282 U. S. 344,
355, 1931; Medina v. United States, 158 F.2d 955,
1946.
32Previous lower federal court decisions have held
hearsay information insufficient to support, arrest or
search, e.g. Contee v. United States, 215 F.2d 324, 327
(1954); Rose v. United States, 45 F.2d 459, 464 (1930),
and see United States v. Bianco, 189 F. 2d 716, 720
(1951); contra, United States v. Li Fat Tong, 152 F.
2d, 650 (1945); United States v. Heitner, 149 F.2d
105 (1945); King v. United States, 1 F.2d 931 (1924).
"'78 S. Ct. 1245, 1249.

tion entirely from statements made to him by his
fellow officers. The court continued,
The complaint contains no affirmative allegation
that the affiant spoke with personal knowledge
of the matters contained therein; it does not indicate any sources for the complainant's belief;
and it does not set forth any other sufficient
basis upon which a finding of probable cause
could be made. We think these deficiencies could
not be cured by the Commissioner's reliance
upon a presumption that the complaint was on
the personal knowledge of the complaining
officer.4
In the strict sense of the rules of evidence, this
is an objection based on lack of first-hand or personal knowledge rather than an objection based on
the hearsay rule.3 5 The affiant stated that Giordenello received and concealed narcotic drugs in violation of the law, yet, "... . what the witness represents as his knowledge must be an impression derived from the exercise of his own senses, not from
the reports of others; in other words, it must be
founded on personal observation." 6 The agent did
not place before the Commissioner in support of
his allegation in any form, sworn or unswom, the
prior declarations of his fellow officers. If he had
attempted to prove the truth of his allegation by
the mere repetition of what he had heard others
say, then the question of hearsay could have been
validly raised.1 Yet the Giordenello decision, while
it disposed of the case on the basis of a lack of
probable cause based on the personal knowledge of
the affiant, it did not indicate whether this personal knowledge could in any degree be combined
with some hearsay information. But while the
Court might allow some hearsay information to
come before the commissioner or magistrate in
support of a warrant, the implication of the instant
decision is that there still must be present sufficient
personal knowledge to support probable cause independently of any hearsay information.
Certainly the requirement of personal knowledge
by affiant of the facts constituting the alleged
crime is not new with the Giordenello case. In 1877,
Justice Bradley, sitting as a circuit judge, stated
that a warrant could not issue upon mere suspicion
or belief, but only upon probable cause supported
mIbid, p. 1250.
5See Wigmore, Evidence (1940) §§650-657 and
§1361; McCormick, Evidence (1954), §226.
86 Wigmore, op. cit., Sec. 657; see, Bushel's Case, 6
How. St. Tr. 999, 1003, (1696).
"See, Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S.574, 576, 1883; Queen
v. Hepburn, 7 Cranch 295, 1813 and 1 Greeneaf Evidence, §99 for traditional statements on the essence of
the hearsay rule.
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by oath or affirmation of the affiant. Additionally,
the court ruled that the affidavit must state the
facts within the personal knowledge of the affiant,
that is, the facts which constitute his grounds for
belief. This qualification is incorporated into the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 41-c
states in part that, "a warrant shall issue only on
affidavit sworn to before a judge or commissioner
and establishing the grounds for issuing the warrant.... It shall state the grounds or probable
cause for its issuance and the names of the persons
whose affidavits have been taken in support
thereof." s
In United States v. MichalskiM the court ruled
that the facts supporting the affidavit must be
within the knowledge of the parties making them,
that is, the statement of facts must not be the conclusion of an unsworn third party. Similarly, in
Worthingtan v. United States0 a court of appeals
held that not only does the requirement of personal
knowledge apply to the issuance of the formal
process of a warrant, but it also applies to those
instances where the warrant may be validly dispensed with. Additionally, the requirement of
personal knowledge applies to the facts constituting the crime and not just to those circumstances
which surround the alleged crime. Thus, in a recent
district court case it was ruled that the.search
warrant was unreasonable because it was issued
for the arrest of one alleged to have violated the
federal gambling tax statute; yet the affidavit in
support of the warrant merely established that the
complainant believed that the accused was in fact
engaged in gambling, not that he had failed to pay
the federal tax. Gambling is not a federal crime
but rather a state crime. To adequately support
the warrant, it would be necessary to show not
just that the accused was engaged in gambling
activities but also that he had not registered
and
4
paid the federal tax as required by law. 1
Not all of the lower courts have been in agreement on the issue of personal knowledge. In a district court decision in 1953 the court held that
38FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 18
USCA 461; essentially the same requirements apply
to arrest warrants, see Rules 3-4, Fed. Rules Criminal
Procedure, 18 USCA, n. b. Appendix of Forms, form
15, 18 USCA 618, also, GUANDOLO AND KENNEDY,
FEDERAL PROCEDURE FORMS (1949) §36, "Warrants,"
p. 610-623.
3 265 Fed. 841 (1919).
40 166 F.2d 557, 564 (1948).
41United States v. Office No. 508, Ricou-Brewster
Bldg., 119 F. Supp. 24 (1954); see also Clay v. United
States 246 F.2d 298, 1957 where both conditions
were supported by the affiant.

while the mere information of a third party, withott an effort to check its accuracy, would be
insufficient to issue a warrant, still it is not required
"... that probable cause be established solely by
facts within the personal knowledge of the arresting
officers .... A combination of information and personal knowledge, however, may raise the inference
beyond opinion, suspicion, and conjecture to
reasonable probability.'4 In the same year a
federal court of appeals decision stated that it was
not in agreement with the previous Worthington
decision to the extent that the latter held that
personal knowledge of the affiant was a requirement of probable cause. On the contrary the court
felt that an officer should be allowed to act on
reliable information furnished to him by others,
even if the information is not within the personal
knowledge of the officer. 43 It is doubtful, however,
if the court meant that a warrant could issue
merely upon the conclusions of third parties unsupported by any affirmative statements. At least
the weight of previous decisions would be against
such an interpretation. 44
In the above discussion of sufficiency of warrants
and the problems of hearsay information and personal knowledge there is an obvious danger and
that is that one might unwittingly assume that
the strict rules of evidence should apply to the ex
parte proceeding for the issuance of a warrant.
Perhaps the Supreme Court was moving in that
direction in the Giordenello case. Certainly such a
position is implicit in the language of some lower
federal court cases. In fact the Supreme Court
1
stated in 1932 in Grau v. United States"
that a
"search warrant may issue only upon evidence
which be competent in the trial of the offense before a jury....

,4 6 However, in 1949 in a footnote

to Brinegar v. United Stales 47 the majority stated
that the Grau case proposition had ...... no authority in the decisions of this Court." Subsequent
lower federal court decisions have generally followed the Brinegarrather than the Grau case, that
is, that while some degree of personal knowledge
42United States v. Hill,
43Mueller v. Powell, 203

114 F. Supp. 441 (1953).
F.2d 797, 802 (1953).
United States v. Horton, 86 F. Supp. 92
(1949); Brewer v. State, 255 P.2d 954 (Okla., 1950);
Roblfing v. State, Ind., 88 N. E. 2d 148 (1949); United
States v. Kennedy, 5 F.R.D. 310, 312 (1946); United
States v. Clark, 29 F Supp., 138, 139-140 (1939);
14E.g.

United States v. Wisnilwski, 47 F.2d 826 (1931).
45 287 U. S. 124 (1932).
46

Citing Giles v. United States, 284 Fed. 208 and

Wagner v. United States, 8 F. 2d 581; accord: Worth-

ington v. United States, 166 F. 2d 557, 564-565 (1948).
4

338 U. S. 160, 175, n. b. footnote 13 (1949).
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of the facts constituting the alleged crime is required in the affidavits in support of the warrant,
still the facts do not have to be facts which would
be competent before a jury.
At least the Brinegar decision has to its credit
that it is more consistent with the nature of an ex
parle proceeding than the Grau case. The primary
reason why hearsay information is excluded during
a trial is the lack of an opportunity for adversary
cross-examination of the absent witness.4 In the
ex parte proceeding for the issuance of a search
warrant there is, of course, no opportunity for
adversary cross-examination and thus the primary
factor for testing the reliability of evidence is
absent.- Hence, in the absence of the principal
48
E.g. Washington v. United States, 202 F. 2d 214
(1953), cerl. den., 345 U. S. 956, (1953); United States
v. Bell, 126 F. Supp. 612 (1955); United States v.
Reynolds, III F. Supp. 589 (1953); United States v.
Daniels, 10 F.R.D. 225 (1950); see also, "Probable
Cause Requirement for Search Warrants," 46 HAR.
L. Rzv. 1307 (1933), and "Probable Cause... for
Search Warrants," 13 ST. Louis L. Rnv. 101 (1927).
"See, Wigmore, Evidence (1940) §1361 and McCormick, Evidence (1954) §224.
OThis was essentially the position taken by the
Court with regard to evidence in support of indictments

means of eliminating unreliable evidence, hearsay
becomes as valid a basis for probable cause as any
other evidence. But if the Grau rule were carried to
its logical conclusion, warrants could never be
issued upon the sworn affidavits of third parties,
since such affidavits would be inadmissible as evidence in a criminal trial against the accused.
There are several compelling reasons why the
Grau rule should not be followed. First and foremost is the consideration that such a strict requirement would unnecessarily tie the hands of our law
enforcement agencies in the adequate enforcement
of criminal law. Secondly, as the ex parte proceeding is a preliminary one, the accused is in. far
less danger than he would be at a trial, and correspondingly, the rules of evidence should be less
restrictive. Finally, there is ample opportunity for
judicial review of probable cause under the Weeks
rule of exclusion of evidence illegally obtained.51
in United States v. Costello, 350 U. S. 359 (1955),
where the Court held that an indictment was not open
to challenge on the basis that only hearsay irfrmation
was presented to the grand jury.
5,Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S.383 '(1914).

